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Abstract
In this paper, we study the effects on the survival rate in the employment of a 
scheme that facilitates gradual retirement through working time reductions. We use 
information on the entire labour market career and other observables to control for 
the selection and take dynamic treatment assignment into account. We also estimate 
a competing risks model considering different (possibly selective) pathways to early 
retirement. We find that participation in the scheme prolongs employment during 
the first 2 (4) years for men (women). However, when individuals become eligible 
for early retirement, the effect reverses. This suggests that TC initially improves the 
work–life balance, but that it eventually decreases labour market attachment and sig-
nals to employers a preference for early retirement. The institutional environment in 
which part-time participants are entitled to full-time pensions reinforces the latter 
process. Participation in TC seems also to generate a slight, statistically insignifi-
cant, improvement in health.
Keywords Part-time work · Older workers · Inverse probability weighting · 
Dynamic selection into treatment · Endogenous sampling
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1 Introduction
Population ageing puts enormous pressure on Social Security provisions in many 
developed countries. One of the main factors involved in this is the low labour force 
participation of older workers, and in particular, of older women. In EU-15 coun-
tries in 2015, the labour force participation rates of workers aged 55–64 were 26 
percentage points below those of workers aged 25–54 (OECD 2017). This difference 
was even more pronounced for Belgium, the country of analysis in this paper, where 
the participation rate of the older age group is 39 percentage points lower than the 
younger one. Gradual reduction in the working time at the end of the career has been 
proposed as a tool to prolong the working career and to increase the activity rates of 
older workers (e.g. Schmid 1998). This would reduce the risk of dropping out of the 
labour force due to health problems (Ahn 2016) or improve the work–life balance, 
partly by taking up care obligations (Gielen 2009; Van Looy et al. 2014). These ben-
efits of gradual retirement have, however, been contested by others. Employers may 
use subsidized part-time employment at the end of the career as an easy way to get 
gradually rid of less productive older workers, thus making it in practice a bridge to 
early retirement (Graf et al. 2011). In this paper, we aim at shedding more light on 
this controversy based on the evaluation of a Belgian scheme that subsidizes work-
ing time reductions at the end of the career.
Several EU countries have put gradual retirement schemes in place for older 
workers.1 These can take different forms. In Sweden, Finland, Denmark and France, 
workers can reduce their working time and top up their income by prematurely 
drawing from their pension entitlements. In Italy, Belgium, Germany and Austria, 
the government subsidizes working time reductions at the end of the career to par-
tially compensate for the income loss. In the last three countries, employees can also 
choose the so-called block model. This model concentrates the reduced working 
time in the years prior to retirement by taking a leave of absence, inducing retire-
ment to be early instead of gradual. Finally, before its abolition in 2012, Dutch 
employees could “save” time early in their career to reduce working time later on. 
Currently, they can only retire gradually in their second pillar pension scheme.
Evidence on the effectiveness of gradual retirement schemes based on counterfac-
tual impact evaluations is scarce. Graf et al. (2011) and Huber et al. (2016) estimate 
the effects of the Austrian, respectively, German, gradual retirement scheme based 
on flexible methods that solve the selection problem by conditioning on a rich set of 
individual, firm and regional characteristics. Both studies find that gradual retire-
ment reduces the likelihood of unemployment. However, this does not imply that 
these workers remain employed longer, because if the “block model” is chosen, the 
worker is officially employed without actually working. Berg et al. (2015) also eval-
uate the German partial retirement scheme, but based on a difference-in-differences 
1 See Internet Appendix B for an overview of such schemes in the countries mentioned in the text.
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strategy. They find that participation in the scheme prolongs the working career for 
men, but less so in periods of more intensive use of the block model. Finally, Elsayed 
et al. (2015) use a stated preferences experiment based on vignettes to evaluate the 
effect of various hypothetical pension reforms in the Netherlands, among which the 
introduction of gradual retirement. This study finds that gradual retirement would 
induce workers to retire 1 year later, on average, but also that total labour supply 
would still fall by 3.4 months.
In Belgium, private sector employees older than fifty are subsidized within the 
time credit (TC) scheme to reduce their working time by 20%, 50% or 100% until 
retirement. Since the 100% working time reduction is like a “block model” that 
resembles more an early than a gradual retirement scheme, focusing on the par-
tial working time reductions is more informative for our research question (Berg 
et al. 2015). We evaluate the impact of TC on the survival rate in employment up 
to 8  years after entry in the scheme as well as on the different exit destinations. 
To that end, we exploit very rich administrative data on social benefits, firm and 
household characteristics and labour market histories from as early as 1957 (grant-
ing us an observation period up to 45  years of labour market history). We argue 
that we can eliminate the potential selection bias by conditioning on this abundance 
of relevant information. In particular, even if information on variables such as abil-
ity, motivation and health is missing, their influence on labour market outcomes is 
likely to have already become manifest in the previous employment history of the 
individuals. Therefore, we argue that conditioning on the complete employment his-
tory removes the bias due to differences in time-invariant unobserved characteristics 
(Imbens and Wooldridge 2009; Lechner et al. 2011).
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, by considering a com-
peting risks duration model, we explicitly study how the effect of the working time 
reduction interacts with supply incentives to exit the labour force via early retire-
ment schemes. Second, studies find that many cognitive skills decline with age, 
along with physical strength and health (e.g. Picchio 2015). Consequently, working 
full-time may be perceived as increasingly demanding as workers age and therefore 
induce a higher incidence of sickness. Therefore, reducing the work load to part-
time can have beneficial effects on the health of the participants. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to provide evidence on the impact of gradual retirement 
on the incidence of sick leave.2 Finally, from a methodological perspective, we 
explicitly take into account that the TC scheme is not entered at a fixed moment, but 
can happen at any time. Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) have shown that in case 
of dynamic assignment into treatment methods that eliminate the selection bias by 
conditioning on a set of observables while maintaining the assumption that the treat-
ment assignment is static are biased. Crépon et al. (2009) and Vikström (2017) fur-
ther generalize the approach of the aforementioned authors by allowing for, respec-
tively, selective right censoring and selection on time-varying covariates. Even if in 
our analysis we condition on time-constant covariates only, we follow the estimation 
2 Ahn (2016) studies the effect of working time reductions on healthier life style, but does not directly 
measure the effect on health.
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procedure proposed by Vikström (2017), because, being based on an inverse prob-
ability weighting (IPW) approach, it can by an appropriate additional reweighting 
very easily accommodate for the endogenously sampled data in this application. We 
demonstrate that, in particular in the competing risk framework, correcting for selec-
tivity into the competing risk can eliminate substantial bias relative to the method of 
Fredriksson and Johansson.
The main findings can be summarized as follows. We estimate a positive short-
run effect of the TC on the survival rate in employment. This effect becomes neg-
ative after 2 (4) years for men (women). Qualitatively these effects are similar to 
those found by Graf et al. (2011) for Austria and Huber et al. (2016) for West-Ger-
man men. We decompose these effects into the exit destination and find that the neg-
ative effect is mainly driven by the enhanced take-up of statutory early retirement. 
This is consistent with financial incentives, because, despite working part-time, the 
beneficiary of the TC is in this case entitled to the pension of a full-time worker, 
which is in most cases higher than any alternative benefit. We also find that partici-
pation in TC slightly reduces the incidence of sick leave, but not significantly, so that 
improved health is not the dominant explanation for the positive effect. We argue 
that this weak effect is due to the targeting of TC to a relatively healthy population.
The paper is structured as follows. We start with a literature review. Section 3 
describes the institutional context and Sect.  4 the sampling scheme and the data. 
Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy (identification and estimation) while Sect. 6 
presents the empirical results. The final section summarizes the findings and con-
cludes. Appendix contains (1) a description of the endogenous stratification of the 
sample, (2) the sample selection, (3) the details of the estimation methods and (4) 
tables with supplementary results. Internet Appendix contains (A) a cost-benefit 
analysis, (B) a comparison of gradual retirement schemes in Europe and (C) further 
heterogeneous treatment effects.3
2  Literature review
Working time reductions may reduce the risk of dropping out of the labour force by 
counteracting the declining health of older workers (Ahn 2016) or by allowing work-
ers to improve their work–life balance, partly by taking up care obligations (Gielen 
2009; Van Looy et al. 2014). Firms may voluntarily grant working time reductions 
to keep valuable (firm-specific) competences and transfer know-how to younger 
employees (Eurofound 2001; Kantarcı and van Soest 2008). However, institutional 
constraints, such as provisions that the pension allowances depend on the last wage, 
or that a pension cannot be drawn upon while working part-time, may discourage 
older workers to reduce working time. In addition, employers may not be willing 
to award gradual retirement options (Hurd 1996; Charles and Decicca 2007; Gielen 
2009) so that government coercion or incentives may be necessary.
3 Internet Appendix can be found here: https ://sites .googl e.com/site/resea rchan dreaa lbane se/Inter netAp 
pendi x_TC.
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It is, however, far from guaranteed that eliminating institutional barriers and 
offering an explicit option to retire gradually through part-time work would keep 
older workers longer in the workforce or increase the total number of hours worked. 
First, the pay of older workers may exceed their productivity.4 If employment pro-
tection is strong, firms may use subsidized part-time employment at the end of the 
career as an easy way to gradually get rid of these less productive workers. Grad-
ual retirement is then just a “bridge” to (early) retirement and does not prolong the 
working career (Graf et al. 2011). This process may be reinforced if a phased reduc-
tion in working hours (1) does not lead to a proportional reduction in the workload 
(Devisscher and Sanders 2008; Rudolf 2014), (2) signals to employers a preference 
for early retirement (Machado and Portela 2012) or (3) just decreases labour market 
attachment. Finally, even if the withdrawal from the labour force is delayed, the total 
number of hours worked may still decrease. An hours constrained worker without 
the possibility of reducing working time can either stop working altogether or stay in 
work full-time. With the possibility to adjust the working time, the number of hours 
worked increases in the first case and decreases otherwise. The net effect depends on 
the relative size of these effects (Gielen 2009).
The empirical literature studying the effectiveness of gradual retirement schemes 
based on counterfactual evaluations is very sparse. Graf et al. (2011) study the Aus-
trian old age part-time (OAPT) scheme based on the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) using propensity score methods (see, for example, Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009). They contrast participants in the OAPT scheme between 2000 
and 2003 to a control group to whom a hypothetical start date was assigned accord-
ing to the simulation procedure described in Lechner and Wunsch (2008).5 They 
find that the OAPT scheme increases the number of days employed by 30 days dur-
ing each of the first 2 years after entrance. However, in the fourth and fifth year the 
OAPT decreases the number of days employed by about 35 for women and by nearly 
50 for men, leading to a cumulatively negative effect over 5  years. Moreover, as 
OAPT participants work part-time, the full-time equivalent time worked diminished 
over 5 years by 26 (23) percentage points for men (women). On the other hand, the 
time spent in unemployment fell over this period by 37 (43) days for men (women). 
This is most likely because in the “block model” these workers were not required to 
be made redundant, since they were not working anyway.
Huber et al. (2016) use the CIA to study the effect of introducing partial retire-
ment in Germany. They estimate the intention-to-treat effects of the OAPT by con-
trasting the labour market outcomes of male employees in firms that started offering 
partial retirement between 2000 and 2002 to those in firms that did not offer this 
opportunity in this period. In East Germany, the option of partial retirement did not 
have any significant impact on the timing at which the labour market was left, but it 
4 There is some evidence that declining productivity with age or deferred compensation schemes induces 
a pay-productivity gap for older workers (e.g. Hellerstein and Neumark 2007; Aubert and Crépon 2003, 
2006; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta,2005) and in particular in Belgium (Cataldi et al. 2012; Vandenberghe 
et al. 2013). By contrast, no pay-productivity gap is found by Cardoso et al. (2011) and van Ours and 
Stoeldraijer (2011).
5 This procedure has been criticised by Fredriksson and Johansson (2008).
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did decrease the exit to unemployment schemes. However, as in Austria, the “block 
model” affected the pathway to retirement. Rather than transiting to unemployment 
prior to retirement participants entered the non-employment block of the scheme. 
Though in the first 2 years, the effects in West Germany are not very different; after 
three to 4  years, the effect on unemployment disappears and the share of treated 
workers exiting the labour force increases. The authors attribute the different effects 
between West and East Germany to the difficult labour market conditions in the lat-
ter region.
Berg et  al. (2015) also evaluate the German partial retirement scheme based 
on a difference-in-differences strategy which contrasts a younger control group of 
50–54-year olds to a treatment group of 55–65-year olds in the pre-treatment period 
(1993–1998) and two post-treatment periods: 1999–2001 and 2002–2004, respec-
tively, a period in which the block model was less and more intensively used. Dur-
ing the period of less (more) intensive use of the block model, male participants 
remained 1.8 (1.2) years longer employed than non-participants, if the time not 
worked during the second phase of the block model is not considered as employ-
ment. The employment of female participants was, however, not affected in the for-
mer period, while it even declined by 0.2 years in the latter.
Finally, Elsayed et al. (2015) use vignettes in a Web-based survey of 3611 Dutch 
public servants to evaluate the introduction of an early retirement scheme in the 
Netherlands. In this survey, respondents get different vignettes of hypothetical retire-
ment scenarios, including gradual retirement with a 50% working time reduction in 
working time and an entitlement to half the full pension. For each vignette, respond-
ents state at which age they would retire. To provide causal interpretations of the 
systematic relations between the responses and the scenarios, the scenarios were 
randomly assigned to the respondents. The study finds that gradual retirement would 
induce workers to retire on average 1 year later. However, total lifetime labour sup-
ply would still fall by 3.4  months, because the reduced working hours within the 
gradual retirement scheme dominate the delayed exit from the labour force.
3  Gradual retirement in Belgium
In 2002, the Career Break scheme, in place since 1985 and available in both the 
private and public sectors, was reformed and relabelled “time credit” (TC) scheme 
in the private sector. The scheme aims at generating a better work–life balance by 
enabling and encouraging employees to slow down their working pace, even with-
out needing to specify a specific motive. Workers younger than 50 can temporar-
ily reduce their working time, while workers older than 50 can benefit from the 
so-called end-of-career TC without any time limit, to enable a more gradual transi-
tion to retirement (Devisscher 2004). Workers can choose a reduction in working 
time between 20 and 50%.6 Provided that the eligibility conditions are satisfied (see 
6 A third regime existed in which one could completely stop working, but since it was hardly used and 
our interest is in gradual retirement, we do not further consider this regime.
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Table 1), the employee is entitled for each month in TC to a lump-sum subsidy of, 
(1) in case of the 20% regime, €2247 for singles with or without dependent children 
and €186 for other household types and, (2) in case of the 50% regime, €400 for all 
household types. For the sample of TC beneficiaries analysed in this research, this 
results in a median replacement rate of 83% of the full-time gross wage for those 
working 80% and of 57% for those working half-time.
The end-of-career TC was very popular. The number of participants grew steadily 
from 8700 in 2002, the year it was introduced, to 88,000 in 2011, the year prior to 
the one in which the age of eligibility was raised to 55. As a share of private sector 
employees aged 50 or more, participation steadily increased from 2.5% in 2002 to 
16.0% in 2011. This growth is related to both the rising employment rate of older 
women in this period and to the increased generosity. Compared to the previous 
Career Break regime, operative until 2001, the subsidy amount was raised by about 
20% in the 50% regime and by nearly 40% in the 20% regime. The share of female 
TC participants steadily grew from 27% in 2002 to 52% in 2011.
In Belgium, gradual retirement within the end-of-career TC usually precedes 
entry in an early retirement regime to which one is eligible before the statutory 
retirement age at 65.8 There are three such early retirement regimes: the early statu-
tory, the bridge pension and the so called “Canada Dry”. We will explain below that, 
relative to the counterfactual of full-time work, the TC does not affect the incentives 
to enter statutory early retirement, while it does reduce the incentives to enter the 
two alternative early retirement regimes. In order to get a better understanding of 
this, we explain in the remainder of this section the main features of these different 
(early) retirement options and how participation in TC affects the replacement in 
these schemes. Table 1 provides a summary.
In the private sector, the statutory pension benefit is maximal after a full-time 
employment career of 45 years. In this case, the worker is entitled to a replacement 
rate of 60% of the average career earnings or 75% in case the beneficiary has a part-
ner without any (replacement) income. This amount is proportionally reduced if the 
career is shorter than 45 years or in case of part-time work (except for beneficiaries 
of the TC) and is bracketed by a floor and a ceiling. The worker can choose to retire 
early, as from age 60, provided that (s)he has worked at least 35 years. The pension 
benefit is calculated in the same way as at the age of 65: there is no actuarial reduc-
tion in the pension benefit.
Alongside the statutory system, there exist two early retirement schemes that 
resulted from agreements between the social partners, i.e. employer organizations 
and trade unions. These schemes find their origin in the objective of employers to 
get rid, even before the age of 60, of older employees for whom the wage cost turns 
out to exceed productivity as a consequence of seniority payment and/or techno-
logical progress. However, the threat of labour disputes with trade unions inhibits 
employers from plainly dismissing these older workers. By offering a generous early 
7 All € in the text are indexed by the CPI and expressed in constant 2004 euros.
8 The statutory retirement age for women was raised by 1 year every 3 years from 60 before 1997 to 65 
from 2009 onwards.
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retirement in which the employers pay a supplement to the UB, the employers attain 
their objective while maintaining social peace with trade unions (Claes 2012, p. 38). 
The first of these two early retirement schemes is the “bridge pension” (also called 
“conventional early retirement”). To be eligible, the worker must be older than 58 
and have more than 20 years of labour market experience.9 The pension benefit con-
sists of the unemployment benefit (UB) and a supplement paid by the employer that 
is equal to half of the difference between the UB and the wage. As the replacement 
rate of the UB, disregarding the floor and the cap, ranges between 40% and 60% 
of the last earnings, the replacement rate of the pension benefit ranges between 70 
and 80% of these earnings. Hence, the bridge pension is usually, but not always, 
higher than the statutory pension, at least in case that one did not take up the TC 
(see below). The “Canada Dry” scheme10 is an unofficial early retirement scheme 
in which the employer pays a supplement to the UB, as in the bridge pension. This 
scheme is more flexible for the employer, because it does not impose an age limit, 
amongst other things. Since there is no obligation for the worker to report the receipt 
of this supplement, no official figures on the use of the Canada Dry scheme are 
available: they officially just collect UB.
A key aspect of the time credit scheme is that for the determination of the level of 
replacement income in the branches of Social Security, such as the statutory (early) 
retirement and unemployment, TC beneficiaries are assimilated to workers with the 
same time schedule as before the working time reduction. Through this assimila-
tion, a part-time worker builds up equal pension rights as a full-time worker and this 
eliminates the financial incentive to retire at a later age than in the counterfactual of 
full-time work. This clearly reduces the effectiveness of the TC scheme to prolong 
the career.
This assimilation to the pension rights of a full-time worker does not hold for the 
alternative early retirement schemes, i.e. the bridge pension and the Canada Dry. 
For these schemes, the supplement paid by the employer is equal to 50% of the dif-
ference between the effective part-time wages in TC and in the UB. Since the UB 
is instead calculated on the fictitious full-time earnings prior to entry in the TC, 
the part-time wage hardly exceeds the UB, which results in a zero supplement in 
most cases. Consequently, to the extent that the more restrictive age and experience 
requirements are satisfied, the statutory early retirement scheme is relatively more 
attractive than the bridge pension (and the Canada Dry) for most of the TC benefi-
ciaries (and more so in case of the 50% TC regime). This means that, compared to 
a full-time worker, the relative advantage of the different early retirement schemes 
reverses in most cases. We expect therefore that the TC scheme should alter the 
pathway to early retirement and especially so in case of the 50% TC regime. This is 
confirmed in the empirical analysis.
9 The legal age of eligibility is 60, but this age has been lowered in most sectors to 58. Moreover, in 
restructuring firms and for arduous professions, the age condition could drop to 50, 52 or 55, depending 
on the agreement in the corresponding industrial committee in which the labour market conditions are 
bargained.
10 “Canada Dry” refers to publicity for the drink Canada Dry: “It has the colour of Whisky, but it is not 
Whisky”. So, the Canada Dry scheme has features of a bridge pension, but it is not the same.
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4  Data and sample selection
4.1  Database
We use rich individual data that were obtained by merging administrative registers 
of the diverse Social Security institutions and of the National Register containing all 
Belgian inhabitants. The database became more comprehensive over time. From as 
early as 1957 until 1998, we have yearly information on earnings for employees in 
the private sector, the number of working days and hours (in case of part-time work) 
and the worker type (blue or white collar). From 1998 onwards, this information is 
available on a quarterly basis (measurement at the end of each quarter), not only 
for employees in the private sector, but also in the public sector. In addition, from 
that time onwards it also provides information about the firm (size and sector), the 
industrial committee to which the worker belongs, the timing of self-employment 
spells, the UB receipt, as well as the participation in the Career Break, TC schemes 
and early retirement schemes. Finally, since 2003, the data have been complemented 
by information regarding sick leave, receipt of statutory (possibly early) retirement 
benefits and replacement income in case of disability, occupational diseases or 
accidents. Since 1998, the National Register also provides yearly information to 31 
December on individual and household characteristics, such as age, gender, nation-
ality, district of residence, household size (by age group) and type (single or couple, 
with or without children). The observation period in this study ends in the last quar-
ter of 2011.
We base our analysis on a sample that was drawn with the purpose of evaluat-
ing the effect of a wage cost subsidy for private sector employees aged 58 years or 
more (Albanese and Cockx 2018). To that end, a representative sample was drawn 
of 243,655 individuals born between the 1 April 1941 and the 31 March 1950, i.e. 
aged between 52 and 61 in 2002. Because in Belgium many individuals in that age 
bracket are already inactive, the sample is stratified to over-represent groups that are 
relatively less present in that age bracket and more responsive to the labour market 
policy reform: low-wage employees in the private sector and individuals transiting in 
and out of employment during this period. Five strata r(= 1, 2,… , 5) are defined and 
nine birth cohorts c(= 1, 2,… , 9 ) for each gender. These strata were defined accord-
ing to employment status in the private sector and the earned wage around 2002 (cf. 
Appendix 1). Because the stratification involves outcome variables of interest, it is 
endogenous and it is well known that consistent estimation then requires to appro-
priately weight the data in these strata (Manski and Lerman 1977; Cameron and 
Trivedi 2005). If we denote the sampling weight for individual observation i belong-
ing to birth cohort c and to substratum r by Wcr,i , then
where Ncr denotes the size of the population in substratum cr , ncr the corresponding 
sample size, N ≡ ∑9
c=1
∑5
r=1
Ncr the total population size and n the corresponding 
(1)Wcr,i =
Ncr
N
∗
n
ncr
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sample size. To avoid cumbersome notation, gender is not explicitly referred to. The 
weighting formula comes from a double reweighting, within and between cohorts.11
4.2  Definition of treated and control group
In this study, we evaluate the impact of participating in TC on the survival rate in 
employment for each year after the entry into treatment up to 8 years (t = 1, …, 8). 
We define as treated the individuals starting the TC scheme in a retained year of 
analysis t = 0 (i.e. 2003 or 2004), while individuals not taking it up in that year are 
considered to be part of the untreated group. The TC scheme was introduced in 
2002. Nevertheless, we start the evaluation only from 2003 and this for two reasons. 
First, we wish to consider the scheme at a moment when it was well established 
and the rules were well known. Second, we aim at integrating the incidence on sick 
leave as a second outcome. As mentioned before, information on sick leave is only 
available from 2003 on. To have a sufficiently high number of treated individuals 
and increase precision, we perform two separate analyses on two treatment groups, 
depending on whether the TC started in 2003 or 2004, and pool the estimates.12
To enhance the comparability of treated and untreated groups, we impose that 
at the moment of sample selection both groups should satisfy the eligibility crite-
ria described in Table 1 (for a full description of this selection, see Appendix 2). 
Our treated sample contains 1227 men and 762 women, representing 5124 individu-
als in the Belgian population (i.e. if weighted by Wcr,i ). If we retain all individuals 
employed in the last quarter prior the treatment selection (2002Q3 or 2003Q3)13 and 
do not impose the eligibility conditions, the untreated group contains 142,154 men 
and 83,983 women. Once we impose the eligibility conditions, the size of the group 
shrinks to 29,791 men and 9658 women (from now on renamed control group). Note 
that, as we pool the data, the same control unit may appear in each of the two peri-
ods of analysis, while treated units can only be present in one period.
4.3  Descriptive analysis
To have a first idea on the possible effect of the TC, in Fig. 1 we compare the sur-
vival rate in employment of the treated and two comparison groups: only the eli-
gible control group or all the untreated individuals. In general, treated individuals, 
especially women, are more likely to survive in employment in the first years, but 
11 First, to restore the representativeness within the cohorts we reweigh the units within each cohort by 
Wc
cr
=
N
cr
N
c
∗
n
c
n
cr
 (where N
c
 and n
c
 are the size of the cohort in the population and in the sample). To make 
the cohorts representative for the population, we weigh them a second time: SW
cr
= Wc
cr
∗
N
c
N
∗
n
n
c
 , so 
that W
cr
=
N
cr
N
∗
n
n
cr
.
12 In principle, we could also consider TC that started in later years, but these additional treatments 
would not be helpful in identifying the long-run effects in which we are particularly interested.
13 As explained in Sect. 5.1.1, we start the treatment one quarter before the actual take-up of the TC, 
which occurs in 2003 or 2004. Therefore, the last exogenous quarter before the start of the selection into 
treatment is 2002Q3 (2004Q3).
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the cumulated effect on the survival rate eventually reverses and becomes highly 
negative. The figure also shows that it is crucial to impose the eligibility conditions 
on the control group, especially for men: non-eligible individuals are more likely to 
remain in employment, so that a neglect of these conditions would severely down-
ward bias the treatment effect of the TC on the survival rate.
Even if the individuals satisfying the eligibility conditions are already homog-
enous in several dimensions (e.g. private sector employment experience, tenure, 
firm size and working full-time prior to the selection), they still differ significantly 
in a number of other dimensions. The latter is apparent in Table 2, which reports, 
by gender, the averages of the observed characteristics for treatments14 and eligible 
controls, as well as the p-values for the tests of their equality.
Considering the variables measured in the last quarter prior to the start of the 
selection into treatment (i.e. 2002Q3 or 2003Q3), treated units tend to work in larger 
firms, live with a partner without dependent children, are slightly younger, earn a 
lower hourly wage and are more likely to be Belgians living in Flanders. They are 
Fig. 1  Differences in survival rate in employment by treatment status—eligible control group or all 
untreated individuals. Differences in survival rate by treatment status (ATT). Survival is defined with 
respect to employment, and the point estimates are expressed in percentage points (pp). Pooled estimates 
for the treated samples of 2003 and 2004. “Raw” estimates are obtained by using all the untreated indi-
viduals (dashed line), while “eligible” restricts the control group to the individuals satisfying the eligi-
bility conditions at year 0 (tick line). Standard errors are cluster robust to take into account correlation 
between the same individuals in the two samples
14 54.3% of the treated is in the 50% TC regime, the remainder in the 20% TC regime.
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also concentrated in specific, mostly white collar, sectors, such as the banking and 
business related services, where bridge pension schemes are less common.
Considering the employment history,15 in line with the year before the selection, 
treated individuals earn a lower hourly wage 5 years before selection and had lower 
average annual earnings since 1957 (the difference is statistically significant only 
for men). Tenure in the same firm is slightly shorter and total accumulated working 
experience since 1957 is slightly more important. If we consider also the 5 years of 
tenure prior to the sample selection, then the individuals in the sample have on aver-
age about 36 years of experience, which makes many of them already eligible for 
statutory early retirement.
5  Empirical strategy
We are interested in estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in 
TC on the survival rate in employment. An exit from employment is defined as soon 
as an individual is not observed in employment at the end of a quarter. In case of an 
exit, 93% of the individuals satisfying the eligibility conditions in t = 0 never return 
to employment before the statutory retirement age. This means that this exit is, in 
most cases, equivalent to an early withdrawal from the labour market, i.e. a pathway 
to retirement. We impose that once a treatment has started, it cannot be reversed. 
This means that the treatment status is not affected in the rare cases that the TC 
scheme is left immediately after having entered it. Here we provide intuitions on the 
main assumptions for the evaluation (Sect. 5.1) and the dynamic setting (Sect. 5.2). 
Details are provided in Appendix 3.
5.1  No anticipation, conditional independence and common support
5.1.1  The no anticipation assumption (NAA)
In order to identify the ATT, three identifying assumptions must be satisfied: the 
no anticipation assumption (NAA), the conditional independence assumption (CIA) 
and the assumption of common support (CS). The NAA assumes that individuals 
do not alter their behaviour in response to a future assignment to the treatment. The 
mandatory 3-month employer notice implies that participation is always anticipated 
and thus that treatment might start before the beginning of the working time reduc-
tion. We take this into account by assuming that actual treatment starts one quar-
ter before the contractual treatment. Additionally, we assume that individuals never 
leave employment between the actual start and contractual start of the treatment. 
The resulting upward bias on the treatment effect (due to higher survival in employ-
ment for the treated) is arguably small. It is unlikely that individuals who agreed 
with the employer to start TC within the next quarter would decide to stop working 
beforehand, with the exception of reasons of force majeure such as an accident.
15 The variables referred to the employment history are not combined to keep information coming from 
different sources and periods with missing information separate.
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5.1.2  The conditional independence assumption (CIA)
The CIA assumes that, conditional on the matching variables in Table 2, the poten-
tial outcome in the absence of treatment is independent of its actual take-up. The 
list of conditioning variable is the key in this respect. We argue that the available 
data are sufficiently rich to justify identification on the basis of the CIA, i.e. that we 
observe all relevant determinants that influence both the decision to participate in 
TC and the survival rate in employment. We first justify this claim based on a theo-
retical reasoning. Subsequently, we implement a placebo test to validate it. As in the 
main analysis, we implement the CIA in this placebo test by an inverse probability 
weighting estimator (IPW).
The literature mentions the following key determinants of gradual retirement that 
also affect the survival in employment: age, place of living, entitlement to (early) 
retirement benefits, household composition, education, health and firm character-
istics, such as size and sector, but also the degree of unionization, organizational 
features and staff related issues, such as staff and skilled workers shortages (e.g. 
Gustman and Steinmeier 1984; Honig and Hanoch 1985; Huber et  al. 2016). The 
exhaustive information regarding labour market history starting in 1957 allows us to 
condition on up to 45 years of labour market experience for the older workers.
First, cumulated experience and remuneration are also the most essential infor-
mation required to determine the level of (early) retirement benefits to which work-
ers are entitled, which is likely to affect the outcome of the analysis. Second, house-
hold information is also sufficiently available. Third, by contrast, the database does 
not contain information on the level of education, and the available direct indicators 
of health can only be used as outcomes, and not as conditioning variables, because 
these direct indicators are only available from 2003 onwards (see Sect.  4.1). We 
argue, however, that before 2003 poor health is indirectly captured by gaps in the 
labour market experience, by lower levels of earnings and by being a blue collar 
worker or not. Observe, however, that individuals with poor health conditions are 
unlikely to eligible for the TC, because eligibility requires prior to the start of the 
TC more than 5  years of uninterrupted employment and full-time during the last 
year, and at least 20 years of working experience. This hypothesis is also consist-
ent with the finding below that the TC only seems to have had a very minor posi-
tive impact on health, if any (see Sect.  6.3). Similarly, past labour market history 
can account for the level of education and other time-invariant unobserved factors 
related to both the selection into TC and the survival in employment (see Imbens 
and Wooldridge 2009; Lechner et al. 2011). In other words, if the treated have con-
stant unobserved characteristics affecting the probability of remaining employed, it 
is likely they have already manifested in this past labour market history. Fourth, we 
condition on the available firm characteristics (firm size and sector) because these 
are highly correlated with the degree of unionization, and, more relevant for the Bel-
gian context, with the working conditions. As a bridge pension is a major pathway 
to retirement, it is important to control for factors that influence the transition to it. 
As mentioned in Sect. 3, the availability of the bridge pension depends largely on 
which industrial committee the worker belongs to. Because the number of industrial 
committees is too large to condition on in the analysis, we constructed a continuous 
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measure of the propensity of transitioning to a bridge pension (see footnote of 
Table 2). Finally, note that we control for these characteristics on top of the eligibil-
ity conditions used for selecting the sample. As Fig. 1 shows, this first selection is 
already very important.
In order to further convince the reader that the matching variables sustain the 
CIA, we provide some validation tests similar to the ones proposed by Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009, pp. 48–50). The idea consists in “… estimating the causal effect 
of the treatment on a variable known to be unaffected by it, typically because its 
value is determined prior to the treatment itself. Such a variable can be time invari-
ant, but the most interesting case is in considering the treatment effect on a lagged 
outcome. If it is not zero, this implies that the treated observations are distinct from 
the controls;… If the treatment effect is instead zero, it is more reasonable to assume 
that the unconfoundedness assumption holds” (Ibid, p. 48).
In order to implement this test, we consider two proxies of the lagged outcome, 
namely the number of working days and full-year employment defined as working 
for at least 10 months over the year, both measured between 15 and 6 years before 
the selection (i.e. t = − 15 to t = − 6). We could not consider the lagged outcome (or 
proxies of it) during the first 5 years prior to selection, because both treated and non-
treated groups are uninterruptedly employed during that period as to satisfy the eli-
gibility condition to TC. We must rely on proxies of the lagged outcome rather than 
the lagged outcome itself for the following reasons. First, in that period only yearly 
instead of quarterly information is available. Second, different from the main analy-
sis, we do not observe in this pre-treatment period the employment status at the end 
of the year, but only the number of working days within the year. This means that we 
cannot unambiguously determine the exit rate from employment. Third, by restrict-
ing the sample in the pre-treatment period to those who would have been eligible for 
the TC in that period, we would change the composition of the sample relative to 
the main analysis, which would reduce the credibility of the placebo treatment. We 
therefore opted to assess the validity of the CIA based on the aforementioned proxy 
variables, which was much simpler to implement and which, being closely related 
variables, should still provide us with a reliable test.
The results of these placebo tests are reported in Appendix 4 in Figs. 9 and 10. 
We observe statistically significant differences only when we do not use the IPW 
weights. This supports the credibility of the CIA.
5.1.3  The assumption of common support (CS)
In order to identify the ATT, we must impose a common support between treated 
and control units. To ensure that this condition is satisfied, we remove treated units 
with a propensity score above the 99.9 percentile of the control units. After trim-
ming, we are left with about 99% of the treated units, resulting in a sample of 1212 
and 755 men and women. Removing control units with too high propensity scores 
is particularly important in the case of IPW estimator, because observations with 
high propensity scores have high leverage and risk to significantly bias the results. 
However, this seems not to be an issue in our analysis as the highest relative weight 
of a control unit is only 0.17% of the total sample, which is a consequence of the 
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large size of the control group. This is much lower than the maximal weight of 4% 
proposed in Huber et al. (2013), so that we are confident that the CS is not an issue 
in this application. Technical details of the trimming approach are discussed at the 
end of Estimation and inference in Appendix 3.
5.2  Dynamic evaluation setting
Because individuals can enter the TC scheme at any point of time, they are dynami-
cally assigned to the treatment. If the aim is to estimate the ATT of such a treat-
ment on the survival probability in a particular state (employment in our setting), 
Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) propose to take this dynamic assignment into 
account by contrasting, as from the start of the treatment, the survival probabilities 
of treated individuals to those of a matched sample of not yet treated individuals. 
The authors estimate the survival probabilities of these two groups by the nonpara-
metric Kaplan–Meier estimator and then take the difference of these survival prob-
abilities to estimate the ATT.16 This estimator accommodates for independent right 
censoring at the end of the observation period or at points that “not yet treated” 
individuals enter the treatment. Crépon et al. (2009) and Vikström (2017) general-
ize this approach by allowing for selective right censoring and show that ignoring 
this selectivity may cause considerable bias. Crépon et  al. (2009) account for this 
selectivity by a blocking estimator in which, at the start of the treatment, treated and 
untreated individuals are divided into blocks based on a sufficient index of the pro-
pensity score. They then apply the Kaplan–Meier estimator of the survival functions 
within each of these blocks, calculate the ATT within these blocks, and average over 
the blocks to obtain the overall ATT. Vikström (2017) applies an inverse probability 
weighting (IPW) approach to adjust in each period the Kaplan–Meier estimator for 
selective right censoring. An advantage of his approach is that it allows for selection 
on time-varying covariates and that it does not depend on an arbitrary criterion, such 
as the number of chosen blocks in the aforementioned blocking estimator. Further-
more, a relevant advantage in our context is that the IPW approach can be easily 
adjusted to take the endogenous sampling of our data into account, as it just involves 
a multiplication of the IPW by the endogenous sampling weight.
Essentially, we follow for the two last-mentioned reasons Vikström’s (2017) 
approach. We deviate only with respect to the following details. First, as mentioned, 
we take the endogenous sampling into account. Second, we adjust the method to 
allow for the fact that individuals are sampled from the stock of employed individu-
als with at least 5 years of seniority at sample selection. We show that no adjust-
ment is required if we condition on the elapsed employment duration at the start 
period of analysis, i.e. at the (counterfactual) selection into treatment, and consider 
the residual duration from that time onwards. Third, we propose a different trimming 
rule for the determination of a common support for treated and control units. Finally, 
16 If ĥ
s
 is an estimate of the hazard at time s, then the Kaplan–Meier estimator of the survival rate at 
time t is given by ∏t
s=1
(1 − ĥ
s
) , where ĥ
s
 is non-parametrically estimated by the ratio of the number of 
individuals leaving a state at time s to the number of individuals who did not yet leave the state prior to s.
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we propose a slightly different bootstrap procedure for inference on the pooled sam-
ple.17 The details of the methodology are explained in Appendix 3.
6  Findings and their interpretation
We first report the ÂTTt from the first until the 8  year after entry in the TC 
( t ∈ {1,… 8} ) on the survival in employment. We also consider how much the 
effect changes in comparison with the descriptive evidence discussed above. Next, 
we demonstrate in Sect.  6.2 that consistent with financial incentives (Sect.  3) TC 
beneficiaries are more likely than full-time workers to end their career via the early 
statutory retirement scheme than via other early retirement schemes and more so 
for the 50% TC regime than the 20% regime. In Sect. 6.3, we consider the impact 
participation in TC on the incidence of sick leave. Each finding is followed by a dis-
cussion of the potential mechanism. Finally, in Sect. 6.4 we discuss the sensitivity of 
our findings to the choice of matching method.18 The reported results pool the 2003 
and 2004 sample.
6.1  The benchmark analysis
In this section, we show the estimates of the ATT on the survival rate in employ-
ment controlling for selection on observables (Vikström 2017). Figure  2 shows 
that, in line with the descriptive evidence, treated men are more likely to survive in 
employment in the first 2 years (+ 7 pp and + 3.5 pp). For women, however, the pos-
itive effects last until the fourth year and are stronger (+ 8.8 pp, + 10.9 pp, + 8.6 pp 
and + 3.2 pp). The results also confirm strong subsequent negative effects, peaking 
at − 20 pp and − 12 pp after about 5 years for men and women, respectively. Notice 
that as a consequence of ageing, all individuals—both treated and non-treated—will 
eventually retire. This explains why the treatment effect eventually always tends to 
zero at the end of the period of analysis.
These results are in line with the findings of Graf et  al. (2011) in Austria and 
Huber et  al. (2016) for men in West Germany. The pattern is consistent with a 
combination of demand and supply side factors affecting choices at the end of the 
career. Let us first consider the demand side. Cataldi et al. (2012) and Vandenberghe 
et  al. (2013) provide evidence that the pay of older workers is on average higher 
than productivity.19 This pay-productivity gap can be sustained by the threat of a 
costly labour dispute if these older workers would be plainly dismissed (Claes 2012, 
18 In Internet Appendix A, we perform a cost-benefit analysis of the TC scheme under a set of assump-
tions. Overall, the existing scheme does not pass the cost-benefit test.
17 Standard errors are cluster robust to take into account correlation between the same individuals in the 
two samples. The bootstrap is implemented with 500 repetitions and the confidence intervals (CI) assume 
normality.
19 Albanese and Cockx (2018) find that the effects on labour market outcomes of wage subsidies for 
older workers are consistent with this pay-productivity gap.
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p. 38). Instead of laying off these older workers, workers could be separated from 
their employer without the risk of social disruption by the provision of generous 
early retirement schemes (Sect.  3). However, in Belgium these early retirement 
schemes are costly for the employer, as they must pay firing costs and a supplement 
to the unemployment benefit. Hence, they may only be used if no cheaper alternative 
exists. The TC scheme may be such an alternative, as the employer can partially cut 
on wage costs without having to cover any firing costs or supplement. Some firms 
may therefore induce their older workers to participate in the time credit scheme as 
to reduce the total number of working hours of their older employees, an explana-
tion similar to the one provided by Graf et al. (2011) for Austria. Because of these 
reduced costs, firms will also have less incentives to force older workers to retire 
early compared to the counterfactual in which these workers would have stayed 
full-time employed, which is compatible with our finding that the TC positively 
affects the survival rate in employment during the first years. However, this cannot 
explain why this effect eventually reverses, such that TC participants are more likely 
to leave the labour force than in the counterfactual of full-time work. A demand 
Fig. 2  ATT on survival in employment. ATT on the survival rate in employment estimated by control-
ling for the dynamic selection on observables (Eligible-Vikström) and descriptive differences consider-
ing only the eligible control group (Eligible). The estimates of the ATT’s are the percentage points (pp) 
differences between the survival rate of the treated in case of treatment and the estimated survival rate 
of the treated in the counterfactual of no treatment. Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 sam-
ples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified 
bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming 
normality
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side factor that could explain why this positive effect comes to an end is that as 
soon as an employee in TC becomes entitled to the early statutory pension scheme, 
either because she meets the experience condition of 35 years or the age condition 
of 60 years, the employer has an incentive to induce these older workers to withdraw 
from the labour force, as he no longer needs to pay firing costs nor any supplement 
as from that moment. Moreover, because the early statutory retirement scheme is 
for a worker participating in the TC financially more attractive than the two other 
early retirement schemes (see the discussion in Sect.  3), while it is the reverse in 
the counterfactual of full-time employment, the employer can more easily convince 
the worker in TC than a full-time worker to choose this option of the early statutory 
retirement, which remains a more costly option for the employer and, hence, may 
explain why the effect of TC on the survival rate in employment eventually becomes 
negative. Another reinforcing factor that could also explain this eventual negative 
effect is that employers could interpret the choice (of continuing) part-time work for 
a longer period as a signal of lack of motivation and of low productivity (Machado 
and Portela 2012).20
Supply side factors can also explain the non-monotonic effect of the participa-
tion in the TC scheme on the survival rate in employment. Initially, part-time work 
may improve the work–life balance by allowing these workers to combine employ-
ment with the with age increasing demand for caring for grandchildren, parents or 
partner, and for a reduced work rhythm.21 This prevents that these workers would 
completely withdraw from the labour force in the counterfactual of remaining in 
full-time employed (Gielen 2009; Van Looy et al. 2014). However, by working part-
time the preference for leisure and care may increase and eventually decrease labour 
market attachment. This may explain the eventual negative effect of the TC on the 
survival rate in employment. The data do not allow us to determine whether it is the 
aforementioned demand or supply factors that explain our findings.
Finally, we argue that the longer-lasting positive effect on women is due to the 
fact that women tend to have acquired slightly less labour market experience than 
men (Table 2), which makes them less likely to be eligible for early statutory retire-
ment. To corroborate the interpretation that eligibility to early retirement affects the 
impact of the TC scheme, we split the sample between younger and older individu-
als. We set the cut-off age at 56.5 years at the moment of sample selection, i.e. at the 
end of year 0. In theory, the younger workers are too young to already be eligible to 
any of the early retirement schemes. Thus, we expect a longer-lasting positive effect 
for them. As shown in Fig. 8 in Appendix 4, this is indeed what we find.22
20 Since we have argued in Sect.  5.1.2 that by matching on past employment history we can capture 
the selection on fixed unobservables, such as work motivation, this explanation therefore assumes that 
employers falsely perceive that workers who participate in TC are less motivated and/or less productive.
21 For the population eligible for time credit, health issues only seem to matter to a minor extent: see the 
discussion in Sect. 6.3.
22 As the monthly subsidy is lump-sum, we have also estimated treatment heterogeneity with respect to 
labour market earnings at selection. The results are very similar to the different response by TC regime 
as two thirds of the treated high earnings group take the 50% regime (Fig. 7—symmetric figures for the 
low earnings group). Results are available in Internet Appendix C.
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6.2  Competing exit destinations
In this section, we decompose the estimated ATT on the survival in employment 
according to three possible exit destinations: (1) bridge pension, (2) statutory early 
retirement and (3) other exits. The last is a residual category comprising other 
schemes such as Canada Dry, unemployment, disability, other forms of inactivity 
and exit because the individual died. To simplify the estimation procedure, we do 
not estimate these competing risks simultaneously, but right censor the other desti-
nations, when considering the destination of interest. Note that the Vikström (2017) 
estimator allows this right censoring to depend on the conditioning variables.23
Figure 3 shows the estimated ATT (“Vikström-eligible”) and the corresponding 
confidence interval (“Vikstöm-eligible CI”), which indicate that the negative treat-
ment effect is clearly driven by the statutory early retirement option.24 The nega-
tive effect on the ATT that was observed in the benchmark (northwestern panel) is 
only clearly present in the survivor function that precludes exit destinations different 
from those of the statutory early retirement (south-western panel). As mentioned in 
Sects. 3 and 6.1, this is consistent with the financial incentives of both employers 
and beneficiaries of the TC: employers face no costs in case of an early statutory 
retirement, while they have to pay the supplement to UI and severance payments in 
case of the bridge pension or Canada Dry; beneficiaries of the TC are assimilated 
to full-time workers for the determination of the statutory early retirement pension, 
but not of the other early retirement schemes. By this assimilation, it becomes finan-
cially more attractive for a part-time worker to enter the statutory retirement rather 
than the other early retirement schemes. However, it does not make it financially 
more attractive for a beneficiary of TC than for a full-time worker to enter early 
retirement, because they are both entitled to the same pension. Rather, it implies that 
the worker on TC will be less likely to resist to take early statutory retirement if the 
employer wants to induce this to get rid of his older unproductive workers, since, in 
contrast for a full-time worker, the alternative early retirement options have become 
less interesting.
Finally, for a better understanding of the role of financial incentives, we divided 
the treated sample into participants in the 50% and 20% TC regime (Fig. 7). The 
treated sample is divided into 942 units participating in the 50% TC regime and 
1047 in the 20% regime. In the corresponding population, 54.3% of TC participants 
are in the 50% regime. Note that the same control units are used for estimating the 
ATTs of these two treatment groups. As people in the 50% regime are more inten-
sively treated, the positive ATT in the short run and the negative ATT in the medium 
run are more pronounced compared to the participants in the 20% regime. Once we 
right censor the exits to statutory early retirement, the effect for TC participants with 
the 50% reduction is nonnegative for the other two exit destinations. The treated 
individual working at 80% of a full-time have a less pronounced response, especially 
for the exit to statutory early retirement, and rather show more noticeable differences 
23 This is a less strong assumption than the exogenous censoring of Fredriksson and Johansson (2008).
24 To have an idea of the size of the ATT relative to the counterfactual of no treatment, we report the 
level of the survival rates of the treated and (reweighted) control units in Fig. 6 of Appendix 4.
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Fig. 3  ATT of treated men (a) and women (b) and comparison with other estimators. Vikström-eligible 
ATT of treated on the survival rate controlling for the dynamic assignment to treatment (eligible con-
trol group) and selective right censoring on observables (Vikström 2017); Fredriksson and Johansson-
eligible controlling for selection on observables in the year of selection (2003 or 2004—eligible con-
trol group) but not for selective right censoring on observables (Fredriksson and Johansson 2008); the 
ATTs are differentiated by gender: Panel A for men and Panel B for women. The estimates are expressed 
in percentage points (pp) differences in the survival rate in (from left to right and top to bottom) (1) 
employment, (2) employment without exit to a bridge pension, (3) employment without exit to a statu-
tory pension before the normal retirement age and (4) employment without exit to other non-employment 
statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2–4), the exits from employment to other destinations, apart 
from the one considered, are right censored. Reported estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 sam-
ples. Year eight uses information from the 2003 sample. The sample is composed of 1227 (762) treated 
and 29,791 (9658) control units (men and women). Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap 
(clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality
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by gender. Different from the 50% regime, we now also observe a negative impact 
on the survival in employment without exit to the bridge pension for men, while for 
women the impact is insignificant.
As described in Sect.  3, while the bridge pension is in general very appealing 
for older workers in Belgium, it is not for workers in the 50% TC regime, because 
they lose a large part of the benefits. However, because this loss is less important 
for individuals in the 20% regime, the scheme still remains attractive for them. This 
incentive affects the behaviour of women less, however, because they are on average 
less likely to work in industrial committees that intensively use the bridge pension as 
instrument to terminate employment (see Table 2), and, hence, have less opportuni-
ties to use this pathway to retirement.
To conclude, the assimilation of beneficiaries of TC to the rights of full-time 
workers in case of the statutory early retirement regime makes it easier for employ-
ers to induce early retirement of their older unproductive workers and results in an 
enhanced exit to early retirement for TC beneficiaries as soon as they become eligi-
ble for early statutory retirement. This factor plays a more important role for half-
time workers than for workers employed at 80% of the full-time rate and more for 
women than for men. So, while this assimilation may increase the attractiveness of 
part-time relative to full-time work, it clearly reduces the effectiveness of the TC 
scheme in prolonging the employment career.
6.3  The impact on sick leave incidence
It has been argued that granting working time reductions can reduce the incidence 
of sickness (Ahn 2016). We test this hypothesis in this section. In the administrative 
data used in this analysis, health problems can be identified in one of the following 
ways. First, individuals can be identified on sick leave if it results in an absence from 
the workplace of more than 1 month.25 If the absence lasts longer than a year, the 
individual becomes entitled to disability benefits, which is identified in the data as 
an exit from employment. Exits to these disability benefits are, together with exits to 
work injury benefits, a second way in which health problems can be identified in the 
data. However, virtually nobody in the retained sample exits to these destinations. 
Finally, individuals could stop working because they die, but this involves only a 
sample share of less than 1%.
As the incidence of the two last-mentioned health problems is negligible, we 
focus our analysis on the first-mentioned sickness absence only. During the period 
of observation, about 16% of the control group and 13% of the treated group exit 
to sick leave, suggesting a slighter lower incidence for TC beneficiaries. Since rel-
atively few individuals entered these absence leave, we could not consider it as a 
separate exit destination in the analysis, because the number of transitions is too 
small. Instead, we estimate the impact of TC on the survival rate in employment 
in case sickness absence is considered as an exit from employment and contrast it 
25 This is because in the data only the period during which the sickness insurance pays out the replace-
ment income are registered. Prior to 1  month, the payments during sickness absence are due by the 
employer.
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to the benchmark scenario (Sect.  6.1). In Fig.  4, we report the evolution of these 
two treatment effects. We observe that the new treatment effect (dashed line) always 
exceeds the benchmark (solid line). This confirms that TC reduces the incidence of 
sick leave. However, the difference is small and the dashed line is mostly comprised 
in the 95% confidence interval of the benchmark ATT, suggesting that the effect is 
not statistically significant. An explanation for this finding is that the eligibility cri-
teria for TC weed out individuals with major health problems: such individuals are 
unlikely to have been full-time employed during the last 5 years and to have more 
than 20 years of labour market experience.
6.4  Sensitivity to the choice of matching method
Figure  2 also reveals that controlling for the rich set of covariates (“Eligible-
Vikström”) does not significantly affect the treatment effect that was obtained by 
just imposing the eligibility conditions (“Eligible”). Hence, imposing the eligibility 
conditions, which in essence boils down to imposing a similar recent labour market 
history, seems to be sufficient for eliminating the major component of the selection 
bias. Figure 3 allows to study to what extent it matters for our results to control for 
selective (on observables) right censoring (Vikström 2017) after taking the dynamic 
assignment into treatment into account (Fredriksson and Johansson 2008). We com-
pare the Vikström (“Vikström-eligible”) estimator to the estimator proposed by Fre-
driksson and Johansson (“Fredriksson and Johansson-eligible“). The latter estimator 
controls for differences in observables through IPW but ignores that the right cen-
soring could be potentially selective on the conditioning variables.
Fig. 4  ATT on the survival in employment and employment and not on sickness leave. ATT on the 
survival rate estimated by controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström 2017). The 
survival is in employment (ATT empl.) or in employment while not on sick leave (ATT empl + no sick 
leave). The estimates are expressed in percentage points (pp). Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 
2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 sample. The pooled sample is composed 
of 1227 (762) treated and 29,791 (9658) control units (men and women). Standard errors are obtained by 
a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by 
assuming normality. The CI reported is referred to the benchmark scenario having employment as the 
outcome (ATT empl benchmark)
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We observe in panel A (for men) in Fig. 3 a downward bias of the “Fredriksson 
and Johansson-eligible” estimator relative to the “Vikström-eligible” estimator of 
the TC effect on the survival rate in employment for the destinations “bridge pen-
sion” and “other non-employment”, while no bias is observed for the destination 
“statutory early retirement”. In the former two destinations, the latter destination 
is a source of right censoring. As the estimated ATT on the statutory early retire-
ment is negative, we can deduce that men exiting to this scheme are relatively more 
likely to survive in employment than the other men. As a consequence, if one does 
not take this selectiveness into account, the risk set of the former exit destinations 
gets composed of an increasing share of individuals who are less likely to survive in 
employment, because the individuals with higher likelihood of survival are gradu-
ally excluded from the risk set as they exit to the statutory early retirement. As this 
happens especially for the treated, this compositional change biases the estimates 
downwards. Note, the fact that the two estimators roughly coincide when one con-
siders the exit to the statutory early retirement suggests that there is no selection on 
observables when the right censoring is induced by exits to the other two destina-
tions. A similar bias is observed in panel B for women, although to a lesser extent, 
possibly also driven by the less pronounced effect on the statutory retirement.
7  Conclusion
This paper studies whether the time credit (TC) scheme in Belgium, a scheme that 
facilitates gradual retirement through working time reductions, can lengthen the pro-
fessional career of older workers. Recently, many EU countries have implemented 
similar programmes with this aim. However, evidence on the effectiveness of such 
policies is scarce and provides mixed results. Our research brings new evidence 
regarding this question. Overall our evidence is in line with the findings of Graf 
et al. (2011) in Austria and Huber et al. (2016) for men in West Germany. The take-
up of TC initially prolongs the time spent in employment (during the first 2 years for 
men and 4 years for women), but when the beneficiaries of TC become eligible to 
the statutory early retirement, they are more likely to choose this pathway out of the 
labour force.
Both demand and supply factors can explain this non-monotonic time pat-
tern of the treatment effect. From a demand perspective in Belgium, employ-
ers have in general an interest to get rid of their older work force as they are on 
average less productive than what they cost (Cataldi et  al. 2012; Vandenberghe 
et al. 2013). As long as these older workers are not yet eligible to the early statu-
tory retirement regime, employers may have an interest to induce these workers 
to work part-time in the TC scheme, because this may reduce costs and be less 
costly than outright dismissal or separating them through alternative early retire-
ment schemes. When the average productivity of these workers further decreases 
with age, the employer is less likely to separate from these part-time than from 
full-time worker, as part-time workers impose a lower cost. However, as soon as 
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workers in TC become eligible to the early statutory pension, the employer has an 
interest to induce separation through this retirement pathway rather than through 
the other early retirement options, because the former retirement pathway comes 
at no cost for the employer, while the alternative ones are costly. As the deci-
sion to take the early statutory retirement is voluntary, full-time workers have no 
interest in taking it, as the alternative early retirement schemes are financially 
more attractive. However, because recipients of the TC are assimilated to full-
time workers when they claim their early statutory pension, but not when they 
claim any alternative early pension, they are less likely than full-time workers to 
resist when their employer suggests to take-up the early statutory retirement. This 
could explain why effect of the TC on the survival rate in employment eventually 
turns negative. The finding that the eventual negative effect is nearly completely 
induced by exit to the early statutory retirement scheme suggests that this expla-
nation plays a dominant role.
However, supply factors could equally explain this non-monotonic pattern. 
The positive effects in the beginning are likely present because in the absence of 
the option of working part-time some participants in TC would have completely 
stopped working, which suggests that the TC allows individuals to improve their 
work–life balance (Gielen 2009; Van Looy et al. 2014). Initially, part-time work 
may improve the work–life balance preventing that these workers would com-
pletely withdraw from the labour force in the counterfactual of full-time employ-
ment (Gielen 2009; Van Looy et  al. 2014). However, by working part-time the 
preference for leisure and care may increase and eventually decrease labour mar-
ket attachment. This may explain the eventual negative effect of the TC on the 
survival rate in employment. Finally, we find that the TC slightly improves health 
conditions, but this effect is statistically insignificant and cannot, therefore, be the 
main driver of the positive effect. We argue that this small effect can be explained 
by the targeting of the TC on a relatively healthy population.
These findings lead to the following policy recommendations. First, we believe 
that abolishing the assimilation of TC recipients to full-time workers may reduce 
their incentive to enter the early statutory scheme, which thereby could eliminate 
or at least reduce the eventual negative effect of the TC on the survival rate in 
employment. Second, more generally, it may be possible to prolong the positive 
effect of TC schemes by eliminating the perverse incentives to retire early. Since 
2015, the Belgian government has raised the eligibility age to bridge pensions 
from 58 to 62 years and the minimum age to be eligible to the conventional early 
retirement has been gradually increased since 2012 from 60  years and should 
reach 63 years in 2019. Based on our findings, we speculate this could increase 
the effectiveness of the TC scheme. However, since 2015 the Belgian govern-
ment has also raised the minimum age of eligibility of the end-of-career TC to 
60 years. As a consequence, the starting age of gradual retirement has been set so 
close to the minimum early retirement age that it can hardly have any significant 
positive effect on the career length of employees. While the decision to raise the 
early retirement age can be supported on the basis of our findings, the decision to 
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simultaneously increase the minimum age of eligibility to the end-of-career TC 
scheme cannot.
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Appendix 1: (Endogenous) stratification of the sample
The population is stratified for each gender in 9 birth cohorts defined in Table 3. The 
reference periods by birth cohort were chosen in order to observe sufficient transi-
tions in and out of private sector employment for both treatment and control groups, 
determined so as to evaluate the 2002 reform mentioned in the main text on the basis 
of a difference-in-differences strategy (Albanese and Cockx 2018). Each of these 18 
strata is subsequently endogenously stratified in five substrata:
1. The population exiting salaried employment in the private sector within the refer-
ence period;
2. The population entering salaried employment in the private sector within the 
reference period and not contained in substratum 1;
3. The population employed throughout the reference period as salaried workers in 
the private sector and earning a gross wage lower than €100 per day at the start 
of this period;
4. The population employed throughout the reference period as salaried workers in 
the private sector and earning at least €100 per day at the start of this period;
5. The population that was not employed as salaried workers in the private sector 
during the reference period, i.e. individuals who were out of the labour force, 
unemployed, self-employed or working in the public sector.
In each of the 18 strata, a random sample of 2000 individuals is drawn from this 
substratum, while the sample size was 1500 for substratum 4 and 5.26 The size of the 
population is known for each substratum, so that it was straightforward to construct 
the appropriate weights to make inferences regarding the population.
Appendix 2: Sample selection mechanism
In order to enhance the comparability of treated and control groups, we impose that 
members of both groups should satisfy criteria slightly stricter than those that deter-
mine eligibility to TC (cf. Sect. 3):
26 In cases that the population of the substratum was smaller than the population, the complete popula-
tion was sampled.
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1. Being employed in a firm with at least 20 employees at the end of 2002 (2003);
2. Have at least 5 years of tenure in the same firm at the end of 2002 (2003);
3. Have at least 20 years of private sector labour market experience at the end of 
2002 (2003);
4. Being full-time employed in all four quarters of 2002 (2003);
5. Being employed in the private sector in t = 0, i.e. at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3);
6. Not being on sick leave at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3).
Table 4 shows the sample size evolution and represented population after impos-
ing these selection criteria. The fifth selection criterion is imposed at the end of each 
assignment period into treatment, because it is automatically satisfied for the mem-
bers of the treatment groups, so that it is natural to impose it on the members of the 
control groups as well. The other criteria are slightly more restrictive than the TC 
eligibility conditions, so that a few treated individuals are eliminated from our initial 
selection. We are slightly more restrictive for the following reasons:
1. Eligibility conditions 1–4 are uniformly imposed at the end of the year preceding 
the contractual start of the TC so that the same conditions apply to all treated and 
control units;
2. Because the data contain only basic information about firm characteristics, we aim 
at restricting the analysis to sufficiently large firms in which the use of TC does 
not require the consent of the employer (cf. Sect. 3 of the paper). If no consent 
is required, it is less likely that the use of TC is selective in firm characteristics, 
which therefore enhances the internal validity of the evaluation. However, accord-
ing to the rules, no consent is required in firms with more than 10 employees. 
Nevertheless, we include only firms that employ at least 20 workers. This is 
because the available data on firm size are grouped in intervals that do not allow 
identifying firms with strictly more than 10 employees;
3. While regulations do not impose that the labour market experience should be 
accumulated in the private sector, we do because we do not have information on 
early experience outside the private sector;
Table 3  Retained birth cohorts 
and corresponding reference 
periods
Cohort (quarter/year) Reference period 
(quarter/year)
1 2/41–1/42 [2/99–1/02]
2 2/42–1/43 [2/99–4/01]
3 2/43–1/44 [2/99–4/03]
4 2/44–1/45 [2/00–1/05]
5 2/45–1/46 [2/99–4/03]
6 2/46–1/47 [2/00–4/04]
7 2/47–1/48 [2/00–3/05]
8 2/48–1/49 [2/02–3/05]
9 2/49–1/50 [2/02–3/05]
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4. We impose full-time employment in the last year prior to contractual assignment 
into treatment, while for the 50% TC regime the requirement is only to have 
worked at least 75% of a full-time job. This is done to consider only individuals 
who are eligible to both regimes;
5. Finally, we impose the last condition on sickness in 2003Q3 (2004Q3) because 
we want to contrast the impact of the benchmark outcome, i.e. survival in employ-
ment, to a more restrictive variant that considers survival in employment without 
being on sick leave. If we would not impose this, some of the selected individuals 
would not be in the risk set of this second outcome at the start of the evaluation 
period. Imposing this condition only very marginally affects the sample selection. 
Finally, note that we do not impose the age condition, because our sample only 
contains individuals older than 50.
Table 4  Sample selection and size
List of criteria: (1) being employed in a firm with at least 20 employees at the end of 2002 (2003); (2) 
have at least 5 years of  tenurea at the end of 2002 (2003); (3) have at least 20 years of private sector 
labour market experience at the end of 2002 (2003); (4) being full-timeb employed in all four quarters of 
2002 (2003); (5) being employed in the private sector at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3); (6) not being on 
sick leave at the end of 2003Q3 (2004Q3)
a Tenure defined as working in the same firm in the private sector + full-time in 2002 (2003)
b Full-time defined as having a status of full-time work and having a full-time equivalent working time 
during the year of at least 80%
Step Unweighted Weighted by population 
weights
2002 2003 Total 2002 2003 Total
Initial dataset 243,655 243,655 1,050,348 1,050,348
Belgians and other EU-nationals 235,697 241,520 968,760 1,037,979
Remaining individuals after 
imposing criteria 1
86,116 85,217 174,531 282,736
Remaining individuals after 
imposing criteria 2
32,700 23,661 62,210 53,199
Remaining individuals after 
imposing criteria 3
31,923 22,960 60,737 51,796
Remaining individuals after 
imposing criteria 4
31,507 22,592 60,154 51,174
Remaining individuals after 
imposing criteria 5
25,530 17,863 53,786 45,476
Remaining individuals after 
imposing criteria 6
24,404 17,034 41,438 51,840 43,671 95,511
 Treated men 754 473 1227 2012 1851 3863
 Treated women 421 341 762 669 592 1261
 Control men 17,876 11,915 29,791 41,330 34,448 75,778
 Control women 5353 4305 9658 7829 6780 14,609
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Appendix 3: Empirical strategy
Notation
Let t ∈
{
1, 2,… T̄
}
 denote the number of years since sample selection and 
l ∈
{
1, 2,… , L̄
}
 the elapsed number of years in employment at this start. T̄  and L̄ 
are the maximum number of years in employment, respectively, after and before 
selection. In the data, l ≥ 5 , because this is an eligibility condition for the TC and a 
sample selection criterion (Table 1). The random time since sample selection until 
the start of the treatment, i.e. entry in TC, is denoted by S and its realization by s , 
where s ∈
{
0, 1,… , S̄
}
 and S̄ ≤ T̄  . Yl+t(s) is equal to one in case employment is left 
in year l + t and treatment started in year l + s , and zero otherwise. Yl+t(∞) denotes 
the potential outcome in year l + t if never treated and Yl+t the observed outcome. 
Ȳl+t(s) ≡
{
Y1(s), Y2(s),… , Yl+t(s)
}
 and Ȳl+t ≡
{
Y1, Y2,… , Yl+t
}
 denote, respectively, 
the sequence of potential and of observed outcomes. Figure 5 provides a graphical 
representation of the introduced notation.
We aim at identifying the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of treat-
ment starting s years after sample selection against the counterfactual of never being 
treated on the residual survival in employment until year t > s , given survival in 
employment until sample selection:
This extends the ATT as a parameter of interest to the evaluation of a stock 
sample. Since in a stock sample individuals may have a different elapsed 
duration, the conditional expectation is taken across these elapsed dura-
tions, conditional on being employed for at least 5  years to take into account 
that one needs at least 5  years of tenure to be eligible for TC. Observe that 
E[ȲL+t(.) = 0|S = ., ȲL+s(.) = 0] = Pr[T > L + t|S = ., T > L + s] holds, i.e. the 
conditional probability of surviving L + t years in employment given survival until 
L + s . In case L = 0 , Eq. (1) reduces to the corresponding expression in Vikström 
(2017) for a flow sample.
Identification
In order to identify ATTt(s), we use two identifying assumptions: CIA and no antici-
pation (NAA). These assumptions can be formalized as follows:
and
(1)
∀t > s ∶ ATTt(s) ≡ EL{E[ȲL+t(s) = 0|S = s, ȲL+s(s) = 0]
− E[ȲL+t(∞) = 0|S = s, ȲL+s(s) = 0]|L ≥ 5}
(2)CIA∀l > 5, ∀s, ∀t > s ∶ S⊥Yl+t(s)|X
(3)NAA∀l > 5, ∀t < min(s�, s��) ∶ Pr(Yl+t(s�) = 1) = Pr(Yl+t(s��) = 1),
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The latter condition means that individuals do not alter their behaviour in response 
to a future assignment to the treatment. Based on these assumptions (Fredriksson and 
Johansson 2008; Crépon et al. 2009; Vikström 2017) prove that for l = 0 ATTt(s) can be 
identified by successively using the not yet treated at l + t to estimate the exit rate under 
no treatment at l + t for those treated at l + s . Vikström (2017) generalizes by explicitly 
allowing for selectivity on time-varying observables in subsequent assignments into 
treatment. We follow his approach. Because the identification proof is not affected for 
different values of l , we refer the reader to Vikström (2017).
Estimation and inference
Vikström derives the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) estimator, introduced by 
Horvitz & Thompson (1952) and Hirano et al. (2003), to estimate the ATTt(s) defined 
in (1). We follow this approach for the following reasons: (1) Busso et al. (2014) find in 
their Monte Carlo simulation that the normalized IPW estimator is one of the best per-
forming matching estimators in the presence of good overlap. Other Monte Carlo simu-
lations of Huber et al. (2013) and Frölich et al. (2017) confirm the good performance 
of the IPW estimator, although it does not outperform other propensity score-based and 
nonparametric estimators; (2) it is easy to integrate the endogenous sampling weights. 
This merely requires to include an additional weight in the estimation; (3) compared to 
other matching estimators, the IPW estimator is simple and computationally fast.
We provide the most general estimator that does not only allow to take into account 
selective (on observables) right censoring as a consequence of individuals not yet 
treated getting treated (Vikström 2017), but also more general forms of selective right 
censoring that may involve both treated individuals and those not yet treated. For 
instance, we consider a competing risk framework, with estimations of the treatment 
effect on different exit destinations when terminating employment. We distinguish 
between exits to bridge pensions, statutory early retirement and “other” exit routes.
To write down the estimator, we denote the random censoring duration since sample 
selection for individual i by Ci . Generalizing Vikström’s formula (see his Appendix 
A.2) for the endogenous sampling weights Wcr,i and taking the elapsed employment 
duration li into account, we obtain:
Fig. 5  Graphical representation of the notation
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where
where Xi denotes the vector of predetermined explanatory variables, WCl,k(s),i(s) and 
WC
l,k(∞),i
(s) are the IPW weights in year li + k for individual i treated in year li + s and 
not yet treated in year li + k , respectively. pt
(
Xi, li
)
 and ct
(
Xi, li
)
 denote the condi-
tional probability of entering the treatment, respectively, censoring state after li + t 
years conditional on still being employed in li + t − 1 . In other words, they represent 
the discrete hazard of entering treatment, respectively, censoring in year li + t.
To clarify the intuition of the estimator defined in Eq. (4), consider first the case without 
right censoring, i.e. Ci = ∞ , WCl,k(s),i(s) = 1 and W
C
l,k(∞),i
(s) =
ps(Xi,li)
1−ps(Xi,li)
1∏k
m=s+1 [1−pm(Xi,li)]
 . 
Apart from the weights, the first sequence of products in (4) is the standard 
Kaplan–Meier survivor estimator for the treated group. This represents the condi-
tional survival rate in employment until year li + t , conditional on treatment and sur-
vival in employment until year li + s , i.e. the product of one minus the discrete haz-
ards from employment between li + s + 1 and li + t . The second sequence of 
products is a similar Kaplan–Meier estimator for the control group (or individuals 
not yet treated), which estimates the survival rate of the treated in the counterfactual 
of no treatment. In order to make these control units comparable to the treated, they 
are reweighted using the standard IPW weights ps(Xi,li)
1−ps(Xi,li)
 in a static evaluation 
(4)
�ATTt(s) =
t�
k=s+1
�
1 −
∑
i Wcr,i ∗ W
C
l,k(s),i
(s)Yk,i1
�
Ȳl+k−1,i = 0
�
1(Si = s)1(Ci > s)∑
i Wcr,i ∗ W
C
l,k(s),i
(s)1
�
Ȳl+k−1,i = 0
�
1
�
Si = s
�
1(Ci > s)
�
−
t�
k=s+1
�
1 −
∑
i Wcr,i ∗ W
C
l,k(∞),i
(s)Yk,i1
�
Ȳl+k−1,i = 0
�
1(Si ≥ k)1
�
Ci ≥ k
�
∑
i Wcr,i ∗ W
C
l,k(∞),i
(s)1
�
Ȳl+k−1,i = 0
�
1
�
Si ≥ k
�
1
�
Ci ≥ k
� �
WC
l,k(s),i
(s) =
1∏k
m=s+1
�
1 − cm
�
Xi, li
��
WC
l,k(∞),i
(s) =
ps
�
Xi, li
�
1 − ps
�
Xi, li
� 1∏k
m=s+1
�
1 − pm
�
Xi, li
���
1 − cm
�
Xi, li
��
pt(Xi, li) = Pr(Si = t�Xi, Si ≥ li + t, Ȳl+t−1,i = 0)
ct(Xi, li) = Pr(Ci = t�Xi, Si ≥ li + t, Ȳl+t−1,i = 0)
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approach, where ps
(
Xi, li
)
 is the estimated propensity score (PS) for an individual 
treated in year li + s . However, to take into account that individuals who are not yet 
treated will gradually be treated, we must consider that this may change the compo-
sition of the control group over time. Hence, Vikström (2017) shows that we must in 
addition weight the control units by 1∏k
m=s+1 [1−pm(Xi,li)]
 , i.e. by the inverse of the prob-
ability of not yet being treated in each period between li + s + 1 and li + t.
If individuals are right censored before exiting to the destination of interest 
and this is selective (i.e. depends on X ), then this may similarly gradually change 
the composition of, not only the control group, but also of the treatment group 
over time. We therefore need to weight both treated and control samples by 
1∏k
m=s+1 [1−cm(Xi,li)]
 , i.e. the probability of not yet being right censored in each period 
between li + s + 1 and li + t.
In contrast to Vikström (2017), the discrete hazards to treatment and censor-
ing depend on the elapsed employment duration li at sample selection. Observe 
that we can only proxy for this elapsed employment duration, because prior to 
1998 we only have annual (instead of quarterly) information on private sector 
employment and no information on self-employment, nor on employment in the 
public sector. Given that we selected individuals with at least 5 years of tenure 
and 20 years of experience in the private sector, we believe that the bias induced 
by using this proxy is negligible.
We estimate separate ATTs for individuals entering treatment in 2003 and 2004. 
Subsequently, like Vikström, we pool these analyses to have more precise esti-
mates. This is done by averaging the estimated ATTs in each survival year, using 
the endogenous sampling weights to take into account the size of the two different 
treated groups in the population.
where ns ≡
∑
i Wcr,i ∗ 1
�
Si = s
�
.
As a lack of overlap of the PS can bias the estimator and increase the variance 
(Lechner and Strittmatter 2017), we trim treated units who, due to their very high 
PS, do not have a correspondent control unit. In particular, we remove treated units 
with a PS above the 99.9 percentile of the control units. After trimming, we are left 
with about 99% of the treated units, counting 1212 and 755 men and women. Huber 
et al. (2013) propose to remove the control units with a weight higher than 4% of the 
total. However, because the sample of control units is large, this additional trimming 
is not required. In the four analyses (2003 and 2004, men and women), the highest 
relative weight is only 0.17% of the total sample.
(5)ÂTTt =
�
s
ns∑
s ns
ÂTTs+t(s)
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To take into account that the PS in the weights WC
l,k(.),i
(s) is estimated, we boot-
strap the standard errors. As our data come from an endogenously stratified sample, 
we augment the standard bootstrap method and implement a stratified bootstrap by 
randomly drawing for each replication ncr individuals within each cohort–stratum 
cr . This is valid because the bootstrap randomly samples individuals within each 
cohort–stratum (for a review on bootstrap and stratified data see, for example, Shao 
2003). To take individual serial correlation into account, we resample the same indi-
viduals (i.e. clusters) in the two analyses (2003 and 2004 sample) within each 
replication.
In general, once conditioned on the eligibility conditions, the selectivity into 
treatment on the observables is low for 2003. The pseudo-R-squared of a standard 
logit model is 0.068 and 0.026 for men and women. The selectivity is slightly higher 
in 2004. The corresponding pseudo-R-squared is 0.127 and 0.084. This indicates 
that, once the eligibility conditions are imposed, the sample becomes relatively 
homogenous. The IPW estimator performs well in balancing the distribution of the 
covariates. In our worst scenario (women selected in 2004), after reweighting the 
control units by WC
l,1(∞),i
(s) , the median Standardized Bias (SB) is as low as 1.2%, 
the highest SB is 2.9%, the pseudo-R-squared of the reweighted sample is 0 and the 
Wald test for the joint significance of the variables after the reweighting has a 
p-value of 1.
Appendix 4: Supplementary tables and figures
See Figs. 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
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Fig. 6  Survival rate in employment (benchmark) and competing risks—men (a) and women (b). Survival 
function of the treated and control units controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström 
2017) by gender (a men and b women). The survival rates are expressed in percentage points (pp) and 
defined as (from left to right and top to bottom) (1) employment, (2) employment without exit to a bridge 
pension, (3) employment without exit to a statutory pension before the normal retirement age and (4) 
employment without exit to other non-employment statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2–4), the 
exits from employment to other destinations, apart from the one considered, are right censored. Reported 
estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 
sample. The pooled sample is composed of 1227 (762) treated and 29,791 (9658) control units (men and 
women)
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Fig. 7  ATT of treated men and women in 50% (a, b) or 20% (c, d) TC scheme—competing risk (CR) 
and baseline (non-CR) framework. ATT of treated in the 50% TC (a, b) or 20% TC (c, d) on the survival 
rate controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström 2017). The ATTs are differentiated 
by gender: a men and b women. The estimates are expressed in percentage points (pp) differences in the 
survival rate in (from left to right and top to bottom) (1) employment, (2) employment without exit to a 
bridge pension, (3) employment without exit to a statutory pension before the normal retirement age and 
(4) employment without exit to other non-employment statuses. In the competing risk analyses (2–4), the 
exits from employment to other destinations, apart from the one considered, are right censored. Reported 
estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from the 2003 
sample. The pooled sample is composed of 567 (375) treated and 29,791 (9658) control units (men and 
women). Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repeti-
tions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality
 A. Albanese et al.
1 3
Fig. 7  (continued)
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Fig. 8  ATT on survival in employment—heterogeneous effects by age. ATT on the survival rate in 
employment estimated by controlling for the dynamic selection on observables (Vikström 2017). Hetero-
geneous effects by age in year 0: younger (below the age of 56.5) and older workers (at least 56.5 years 
old). The estimates of the ATT’s are the percentage points (pp) differences between the survival rate of 
the treated in case of treatment and the estimated survival rate of the treated in the counterfactual of no 
treatment. Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Year eight only uses information from 
the 2003 sample. Standard errors are obtained by a stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 
500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by assuming normality
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Fig. 9  Validation test: working days and employment pre-treatment (no IPW weights). Validation test 
without using IPW weights: ATT on the yearly working days (panel above) and yearly employment 
(panel below—defined as working at least 260  days over the year) before the treatment (t = − 15, … 
t = − 6). Population: Men (left), women (right). Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. 
Standard errors are clustered by individual and 95% confidence intervals (CI)
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Fig. 10  Validation test: working days and employment pre-treatment (IPW weights). Validation test 
using IPW weights: ATT on the yearly working days (panel above) and yearly employment (panel 
below—defined as working at least 260 days over the year) before the treatment (t = − 15, … t = − 6). 
Population: men (left), women (right). Estimates are pooled over the 2003 and 2004 samples. Standard 
errors are clustered by individual and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Standard errors are obtained by a 
stratified bootstrap (clustering by individual) with 500 repetitions and 95% confidence intervals (CI) by 
assuming normality
 A. Albanese et al.
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